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Abstract: Biogas technology to support rural livelihoods and low-carbon development has been
developed in different projects and programs in the Global South over the last few decades. However,
the existence of multiple projects, actors and designs involved may lead to so-called fragmentation in
governance. This research addresses the fragmented governance amongst the biogas programmes in
Indonesia to study their impact on the implementation; the numbers of biodigesters disseminated
and knowledge transferred. Drawing on concepts of fragmentation, regime effectiveness, and policy
output, the research uses data from interviews with relevant actors, supplemented with documents
review. Findings show that the governance architecture of biogas regime in Indonesia consists of
different types of biogas programmes championed by different types of actors pursuing different
objectives. There had been patterns and periodical shifts of configuration within the Indonesian
biogas regime, i.e., from administrative fragmentation (2007–2009), to conflictive fragmentation
(2010–2012), to cooperative fragmentation (2013–2016), and reduced fragmentation (2017). Shifting
from administrative to cooperative fragmentation resonates with the increase of the number of
biodigesters dissemination more than fourfold in ten years, from 800 in 2007, to 37,999 in 2016.
The distribution of power within the governance architecture among government bodies, NGOs,
and the private sector influenced the speed of implementation and innovation of the biogas programs.
This suggests that a higher degree of distribution of power and cooperation within a governance
architecture contribute to increasing policy output of the regime complex of renewable energy.
Keywords: biogas; fragmentation; governance; Indonesia; regime complex; policy output
1. Introduction
Rapid economic growth in middle-income countries in the Global South has led to heavy
dependence on fossil fuel for energy generation and rapidly rising carbon emissions [1,2]. These
trends go against global climate agreements and national policies and programmes pushing for energy
transitions towards more sustainable energy production and consumption. In terms of energy for
cooking, the common dominant sources are liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and firewood. In Indonesia,
for example, about 40 percent of households still use firewood for cooking [3]. This practice contributes
to forest degradation, climate change, and health issues [4].
In the context of energy transitions related to cooking, biogas is considered as a clean source
that can be introduced, especially in the household level. The use of biogas as an energy source in
the Global South is not new [5]. Since 1929, China has been the world leader in biogas production.
In 2015, the country had a total production of 19 Giga cubic meters biogas with 50 million users [6,7].
Furthermore, there are roughly 4 million biogas digesters operating in India, whilst the use of biogas
Sustainability 2020, 12, 1358; doi:10.3390/su12041358 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
Sustainability 2020, 12, 1358 2 of 23
is also increasing in Vietnam, Brazil, and Tanzania [8,9]. However, the number is still relatively low,
and uptake of biogas systems has generally been slow and sporadic. In Rwanda, Tanzania, China,
India, and Nepal, the lack of government support through suitable policies and incentives is a barrier
to dissemination of the biogas technology. Moreover, there is often a lack of collaboration between
research institutions, governmental departments, and biogas users, to improve the technology’s
dissemination and appropriate, long-term use [10].
In Indonesia, biogas digesters (or biodigesters) have been promoted by different actors over the
last few decades, using different (constructions) designs, financial approach, and promotion strategies.
This has led to a so-called ‘fragmented’ governance landscape. Fragmentation of governance is the
situation where the landscape of different actors and programmes is not fully interconnected and
integrated, and there may be conflicting goals and approaches, due to a lack of interlinkages between
institutions [11–14].
To date, most research on fragmentation has focused on issues related to global governance [11,
12,15–17], with only a few studies discussing the impact of fragmentation on policy output [18,19].
This study addresses the impact of an inherently fragmented regime, around renewable energy, on the
national-level- on its policy output. Such regimes are particularly complex for large lower-middle
income countries like Indonesia [20]. Moreover, while some studies have mentioned the urgency to
assess (self-) organization of a fragmented governance system [11,18,21–23], a key methodological
challenge is to work back from the observed outputs or outcomes of a fragmented system to make
plausible claims about (causal) mechanisms [19,24]. This study makes a contribution to resolving this
challenge. The key scientific problem addressed in this article is, thus, on how to link the fragmentated
(renewable energy) governance landscape to policy outputs.
The fragmented biogas governance in Indonesia has so far had mixed results in terms of policy
output; the numbers of biogas digesters implemented, and knowledge transferred between the different
stakeholders involved. Until 2015, the total number of biogas digesters only accounted for 1.24 percent
of households [3]. Dissemination barriers to biogas digester are found in several aspects; bureaucratic
processes, the time-consuming process of feedstock, issues of social acceptance, different (energy)
priorities, complex monitoring practices, and poor technological maintenance [14]. The key emphirical
problem addressed in this article is, thus, on how to link the capability of the fragmentation in
biogas governance in tackling dissemination barriers and affecting policy output in terms of levels of
implementation of biogas digesters and knowledge transfer.
To contribute to abovementioned empirical and theoretical lacunas, this research explores the
landscape of biogas governance architecture, its fragmentation, and the impact to policy output,
in Indonesian context during the period of 2007 to 2017. Conceptually, this study contributes to
an understanding of whether and how fragmentation is actually beneficial or harmful in terms of
policy output, such as dissemination number and knowledge transfer. As such, this research develops
critical knowledge of the forms and consequences of different types or configurations of governance
fragmentation in a renewable energy regime in the Global South.
After this Section 1 (Introduction), Section 2 explains theoretical and conceptual frameworks
utilised in this study. Section 3 describes the methodological aspects, such as data collection and
data analysis. Then, Section 4 presents the findings from this study, divided into four periods and
concomitant fragmentation types of biogas governance in Indonesia. Sections 5 and 6 are discussion
and conclusion, respectively.
2. Theory
This article draws on the concepts of fragmentation and policy and regime effectiveness, to study
the type and impact of fragmentation in the biogas energy regime in Indonesia. The following
subsections explain these concepts.
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2.1. Fragmentation of Regime Complex and Its Output
A regime complex covers the connection between states’ institutions with various non-state
institutions and actors related to certain problems [25]. The governance architecture is the overall
institutional setting or coordinating structure among institutions and actors within a regime [26].
Studies of fragmentation in regime complexes emerged from the debates about interlocking
institutions [27] which analysed linkages across policy domains and the relationships between
the different institutions [28]. The distribution of power among institutions within a governance
architecture and the interaction of these different institutions are the focus of the fragmentation
concept [16].
In the last decade, the fragmentation concept is often utilised for the topics of (global) climate
and environmental governance [15]. As a renewable energy, biogas governance can be argued to be
part of climate-energy governance. As with any regime complex, the governance architectures of the
climate-energy regime are almost never fully interconnected and integrated, and thus, fragmented [11].
In the global climate-energy governance architecture, this fragmentation relates to a lack of interlinkages
between institutions, for both state and non-state actors [17]. Such fragmentation is not necessarily
problematic and ‘diversity’ of institutions within regimes is something that can be managed [11].
Biermann et al. [11] categorize three types of fragmentation—conflictive, cooperative and
synergistic. Conflictive fragmentation reflects a situation in which there are conflicting principles and
rules among the institutions or programs, due to lack of coordination. Cooperative fragmentation
occurs when the institutional architecture of state and non-state actors is loosely integrated, due to
the existence of actors/organizations that initiate cooperation among each other (Table 1). While in
synergistic fragmentation, the governance architecture is well integrated and have synergy in its goal
and strategy [11]. In this study, we mainly focus on conflictive and cooperative fragmentation as they
are most relevant to the case of Indonesian biogas governance [14].
Table 1. Conflictive fragmentation and cooperative fragmentation within a governance architecture.
Source: Author.
Conflictive Fragmentation Cooperative Fragmentation
Origin of theories Debates about interlockinginstitutions Diverse systems for governing problems
Assumptions
Architectures of governance
are almost never fully
interconnected and integrated
A wide-ranging distribution of power fosters a
policy to include more people or stakeholders
inclusively, performing coordination
Normative degree
Some stakeholders agree that
the architecture of governance
must affirm the value of
fragmentation as “diversity”
The diversity of initiatives is the invisible hand
of a market of institutions that results in better
distribution of functions and effects.
Typical examples Transnational governance Civil society and/or private sectors lead thegovernance architecture
Criteria/indicators Exclusiveness and incoherence Distribution of power and cooperation
In conflictive fragmentation, there are different programmes with (almost) the same purpose,
coming from different policies and different institutions, with unclear governance architecture [15].
Each programme and each institution are exclusive to each other. This regime lacks coordination
between these exclusive actors/institutions, so there are overlapping responsibilities and different
types of decision makings that cause contradicting and/or incoherent actions [29]. This incoherence
hampers priorities to reach substantive goals and primary objectives of the regime, e.g. to improve
output or implementation of biodigesters. In addition, it decreases the opportunity for partnerships to
be fostered [16]. This conflictive fragmentation sometimes occurs within governmental bodies, and it
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is called administrative fragmentation where the same type of programs is located within various
governmental bodies [30].
Cooperative fragmentation has two key advantages which are flexibility and adaptability [31]).
It makes the actors have more space to choose the appropriate action, depending on what fits their
capabilities. Cooperative fragmentation may accelerate the speed of programs’ implementation and
trigger innovation. It may also circumvent negotiation stalemates in governments. Specific institutional
architectures can better account for specific/contextual situations of preventing problems [11].
The coherence in cooperative fragmentation has the potential to be an enabling factor to increase
policy output.
This study looks at historical shifts of configuration in biogas regime to identify forms of conflictive
or cooperative fragmentation and how it affects the policy output of biogas programmes. These
different types of fragmentation are utilized in this study to understand the problem of low policy
output (dissemination number) in biogas governance architecture.
The relationship between the governance fragmentation and policy output links to discussions
about regime effectiveness. Regime effectiveness can be assessed in terms of the extent of the regime’s
performance or achievement of their common objective. The idea of effectiveness implies the notion
of regimes or a governance architecture as potential ‘tools’, where their usefulness in carrying out a
task can be evaluated. In adopting this perspective, evaluation of regime effectiveness concentrates
on a ‘subset’ of consequences; those that are relevant to the function of the regime [32]. In this study,
the subset of consequences is the output of each biogas program, which, when accumulated, is the
collective output of the biogas regime.
To define the output of the regime, policy effectiveness theory is invoked. In policy effectiveness
theory, the effects of the (environmental) policy are classified into four types, which are output, outcome,
environmental impact, and social needs [33]. Policy output consists of several aspects that include the
quantity and quality of the products and/or services delivered by the programme [33]. In this research,
the focus is on the effects of fragmented biogas regime on the performance of output in multiple biogas
programs which together make up the biogas regime.
2.2. Conceptual Framework
This section combines theories and concepts above into a conceptual framework (Figure 1) to guide
data collection and data analysis of this study. Figure 1 shows that there are three quadrants representing
the regime/governance configuration, which are conflictive fragmentation, cooperative fragmentation,
and centralized coordinated. These regime configurations are defined by their characteristics on
indicators in Figure 1.
The horizontal axis in Figure 1 depicts the level of distribution of power among institutions within
the regime or governance architecture, from centralized to inclusively distributed. Centralized means
that there are a smaller number of organizations involved in the regime. Inclusively distributed implies
that there are a larger number of organizations within the governance architecture. The distribution
of power shows how the resources are distributed among institutions or actors, either centralized
(accumulated in few actors) or decentralized (inclusively distributed among actors). To define
the resources, we utilised the classification of three types of resources; the authority, finance, and
techno-scientific knowledge [14]. These resources affect the ability of institutions in supporting the
development and implementation of biogas programs. For example, the distribution of authority,
funding, and technical capacity in installing biodigesters allow them to disseminate biodigester to wider
communities. Equal distribution of power can occur if there is a division of task and responsibilities
among institutions within the governance architecture, and ideally, the task division must be in line
with personnel capability of each institution [29]. To have the division of task and responsibility,
coordination must happen among institutions to lead to trigger partnership among biogas programmes.
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The vertical axis shows the degree of coordination and cooperation among institutions within
the regime, from lack of coordination to coherently connected. Lack of coordination means that there
is insufficient communication among institutions within the governance architecture, in cooperating
to achieve t eir common goals. While coherently connecte is defined as the success of effective
coordination among institutions within the regime, that leads in the ex stence of cooperation nd
partnership among them in pursuing their common goals, such as increasing dissemination number of
biogas technology.
Coordination includes horizontal (across sectors, such as energy to agriculture) and vertical (across
administrative levels, such as national to local) coordination. The measure of coordination is examined
through how far governance architectures of the biogas programs or regime can facilitate coordination
and support collaboration between actors across administrative levels and sectors, such as involving
cross-sectoral institutions and local governments. Furthermore, the existence of a coherent piece of the
framework that integrates biogas programs is also checked (Table 2).
Cooperative fragmentation regime is characterized by the existence of well-distributed power
among institutions. These institutions have a relatively equal distribution of power because they
conduct effective cooperation among them and their programs. On the other side, in the conflictive
fragmentation regime, there is a lack of coordination among institutions within the regime that often
causes a conflict of interest among institutions. Another regime configuration is centralized governance
where the power is centralized and coordinated by a single/few institution(s).
In this study, we analyse the landscape of biogas governance architecture in Indonesia from
2007 to 2017, using the abovementioned conceptual framework, examining the possibility of
occurrence of different regime configurations; particularly on conflictive fragmentation and cooperative
fragmentation. To operationalize the conceptual framework, we draw on the work by Pahl-Wostl,
and Knieper [29] to develop a list of indicators to define the situation of ‘distribution of power’ and
‘degree of cooperation’ in the configuration of conflictive fragmentation and cooperative fragmentation,
in the context of biogas governance (Table 2).
This research aims to find out how the historical changes on the degree of cooperation and
distribution of power in the Indonesian biogas regime affects/results in a different impact on the
performance of policy output. Policy output is operationalized as the number of biogas digesters
disseminated, and the quality of knowledge transfer or information provided through activities, such as
training. These indicators are applied to each biogas program and its accumulation from different
biogas programs as a biogas regime. For example, information exchange through coordination among
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institutions is considered as cooperation that inspires the institutions to reform their planning and
(dissemination) practices on their biogas programme. Furthermore, it could lead to more formal
collaboration and partnership between the program or the institutions, to increase output. There is
a subset of consequences of such a partnership which creates the incentive-effort-output linkages.
The linkages arise when multiple institutions must cooperate and coordinate to achieve policy objectives.
In the context of the case study in this research, the policy objectives are to overcome barriers of
biodigester dissemination, such as how cooperation among programmes/institutions can shorten
bureaucratic processes of dissemination/training activities; accelerating feedstock collection, improving
social acceptance by local community, increasing level of priority toward biodigester use; supporting
participative monitoring practices and technological maintenance. These activities can be linked to
the number of biogas digesters disseminated, and the quality of biogas training, e.g. higher degree of
community acceptance toward biogas makes more local people interested in demanding biodigester
and its training.
Table 2. Indicators as the topic list (adapted from Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, [29]), which were used to
examine configuration dynamics of biogas governance and its policy output in Indonesia.
Regimes Conflictive Fragmentation Cooperative Fragmentation
Aspects and indicators
Governance
architecture
Distribution of
power
Involvement of wide-range of
institutions
Involvement of wide-range of
institutions
No partnerships in
policy/program’s planning and
implementation
Extant partnerships in
policy/program’s planning and
implementation
No distribution of
institutionalized functions,
responsibilities, and power across
institutions/programs
Institutionalized functions,
responsibilities, and power across
institutions/programs are
distributed
No task division in accordance
with the available personnel
capability, across
institutions/programs
Extant task division among
programs, in accordance with the
available personnel capability
Coordination and
cooperation
No national biogas-related policy
or plan is coordinated/integrated
(e.g., national biogas plan)
A national biogas-related policy is
coordinated/integrated
No (in)formal provisions to
support coordination among
organizations across
administrative levels and sectors
Extant (in)formal provisions to
support coordination among
organizations across
administrative levels and sectors
No significant involvement of
local institutions in biogas
programs or in the creation of
biogas-related institutions
Extant significant involvement of
local institutions in biogas
programs or in the creation of
biogas-related institutions
Conflict of interest among
institutions
Joint programme, partnership
among institutions in overcoming
dissemination barriers
Policy output of the regimes
Indicators; The number of biogas digesters disseminated; The amount of information (training) provided.
Multiple institutions can work together to address the dissemination barriers, thus, deliver
proper services to the user community. Collaboration among institutions provides formal incentives
and relational governance mechanism. This choice of formal incentives and relational governance
Sustainability 2020, 12, 1358 7 of 23
mechanisms depends on the degree of interdependence between the various institutions and its tasks,
as well as the observability and verifiability of output [32].
3. Materials and Methods
The study draws on semi-structured interviews, reviews of policy and program reports and
documentation, as well as academic literature. It includes both quantitative and qualitative data,
followed by a series of analyses in relation to the conceptual framework (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. The toolkit of the integrated method and conceptual approach.
In this study, the focus is on the case of Indonesia biogas programs for households and groups
(such as farmers groups). These households utilize small-scale biodigesters with the size of 4–6 m3,
and the groups utilize medium scale biodigester, sized about 20–40 m3. The biogas programs for
households and groups have been established since 2007 in four national-level institutions which are
Hivos (an NGO), the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR), the Ministry of Agriculture
(MA), and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MEF). These selected cases are equal or sufficiently
similar in all dimensions, such as administrative level. These cases are observed with the same approach
and in the same period of time, to minimize the variance of potential confounding factors.
Data for this study were collected from abovementioned four key institutions and other
stakeholders related to their biogas programs, e.g. other ministries, local governments, businesses, civil
society, and academics (Appendix A). A total of 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted from
May to July 2018, in two phases (Figure 2). The interviews utilized purposive and snowball sampling
technique to select key persons (1–2 people) from the abovementioned stakeholders (See Appendix A).
For the interview questions, the topic list from the framework was utilized to guide the interviews.
The emphasis was on questions about the link between conflictive/cooperative fragmentation with the
policy output (of the regime). Each interview had a duration of approximately one to two hours, and
were carried out face-to-face, mostly in the offices of the respective institutions. During each interview,
policy and program reports, as well as documentation regarding biogas programs, were requested
from each stakeholder, to be reviewed for triangulation (See Appendix B).
After collection, all data were organized to prepare the structure of the evidence, based on the
conceptual framework (Figure 1) and its indicators (Table 2). Depending on the nature of the data, they
were transcribed (in case of interviews), scanned (in case of document and literature review) or typed
up (in case of other field notes). Later, for a more detailed analysis, a coding process was undertaken.
The first coding session was done on the interview transcripts, policy documents, and program/project
reports to analyze governance arrangements from each biogas program and its institutions. Afterwards,
the second round of coding was done to analyze the distribution of power and degree of coordination
among biogas programmes and its institutions within the biogas regime. This analysis helped to
Sustainability 2020, 12, 1358 8 of 23
construct an overview of the governance architecture and the type and degree of fragmentation in the
biogas regime.
A third coding round then analyzed the relationships between the fragmented governance
architecture related to the policy output of the regime. To minimize the influence of confounding
factors in this analysis, each relationship between each indicator in the distribution of power, degree of
cooperation, and policy output was carefully reviewed and triangulated from the interview transcripts,
policy documents, and program/project reports. In each relationship analysis, we considered the role
of potential confounding factors. This helped us to categorize the time periods of regime change.
In addition, the criteria for categorizing the time periods was also based on considerations of (1)
data availability from data collection, and (2) data analysis based on indicators within each type
of fragmentation.
4. Results
Our findings allow us to distinguish four shifts of biogas regime configurations in Indonesia during
the period of 2007 to 2017 (Figure 3). Fragmentation of biogas governance occurred from 2007-2016
to different extent: Administrative fragmentation from 2007 to 2009; conflictive fragmentation from
2010 to 2013; and (limited) cooperative fragmentation from 2014 to 2016 (Figure 3). The different
levels of fragmentation within each period affected the policy output of biogas governance architecture
in Indonesia in different ways (Table 3 and Figure 4). As mentioned, two key forms of output are
considered in this article: The number of biodigesters disseminated and the number and quality of
training to biogas users, by the various biogas programs. This collective output from the biogas regime
is explained below and summarized in Table 3 and Figure 4.
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Table 3. Main situation changes in the configurational shifts of biogas governance architecture.
Year Period 2007–2009 2009–2012 2013–2016 2017
Regime
configuration
Administrative
fragmentation Conflictive fragmentation
(Limited)
cooperative
fragmentation
Reduced
fragmentation
Situation
Various ministries
competed for the
budget for biogas
programs
NGOs (Hivos and YRE)
cooperated with the MEMR
(Ministry of Energy), SWEN
(biogas company) worked
with the MA (Ministry of
Agriculture)
BIRU extends the
collaboration
with other
government
biogas programs
Government
biogas programs
are centralized
under the MEMR
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of cooperation is aligned with the rate of rise of biodigester dissemination and knowledge transfer
activities (Source: Author’s data analysis; [34,35]).
The following sub-sections elaborate on how the dynamics within the fragmented biogas regimes
are related to policy output in different periods.
4.1. Administrative Fragmentation (2007–2009)
From 2007–2009, biogas programs were dominated by the governm nt bodies, without significant
partic pation by non-state act rs (Figure 5). At that momen , biogas progr ms were direct d by
different regulatory policies, such as nation l energy planning in the MEMR ( inistry of Energy
and Mineral Resources), integrated a riculture in the MA (Ministry of Agriculture), and ecosystem
conservation in the MEF or Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Bappenas, Personal Communication,
June 2018). These regulations led various ministries, including the MEMR, the MA, and the MEF to
having different biogas programs in their ministry. The MA even had two different biogas programmes
in different directorates, which are in the Directorate of agriculture infrastructure and in the Directorate
of Livestock (TFCC MA, Personal Communication, June 2018).
This situation can be characterized as a regime of administrative fragmentation where different
government bodies have the same type of programs, and limited coordination takes place. The absence
of integration was caused by the lack of overarching regulation to facilitate coordination among those
biogas programs. In this situation of conflicting roles to disseminate biodigesters, those different
institutions competed for a bigger share in national budget planning for their own biogas programs.
Those biogas programmes often had similar characteristics, and biodigesters were generally provided
for free for the communities.
The absence of coordination among the MEMR, the MA, and the MEF became the obstacle for
initiating a partnership for reaching optimum output from the biogas programmes. An implication
of the administrative fragmentation in the 2007–2009 biogas regime to the policy output can be seen
in the data available about the dissemination of biodigesters and the quality of the training to the
users. For example, there was no reliable or integrated data by the government about the number
of biodigesters from the biogas programs in the period of 2007-2009. Instead, data was scattered.
For example, the MEMR and the MEF had actually lost the data, due to poor archiving (MEF, Personal
Communication, June 2018). From the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), it was reported that 952 units
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of biodigesters were disseminated from 2007 to 2010 (MA, Personal Communication, June 2018;
Appendix B). These governmental biogas programmes worked with SWEN, a biodigester-producer
company. With the data from the MA, we can estimate that about 800 biodigesters were disseminated
until 2009 (Table 2).Sustainability 2020, 12, 1358 10 of 25 
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For the output of training, the MEF and the MA claimed that they provided pre-training to the
biogas users. However, this training was conducted with limited resources from the government
and limited time availability by the users. The ministry let the vendors, or third parties provide the
training, and there was no comprehensive monitoring and evaluation (M&E) from the ministry for
the implementation of the digester dissemination and the training (MA, Personal Communication,
June 2018).
4.2. Conflictive Fragmentation (2010–2013)
In 2009, Hivos (an international NGO) e tered the biogas regime by establishing a biogas pr gram
called BIRU or Household biogas project (Hivos, Personal C munication, June 2018). In addition,
new program es appeared in the MEF a d the MEMR (Figure 6). BIRU devel ped a partnership
with the MEMR biogas programme in 2010, which increased the level of priority of biogas in e er y
mix targeted by the MEMR. Likewise, many ocal gove nments lso have thei own biogas progra s,
which were not always linked to the national biogas pr grams (Energy agency-West Jav , Personal
Communication, June 2018). The mergence of hese new biogas programmes shows that power was
more distrib ted among various act rs within the bi gas regime, compared to th e io 2007–2009.
Table 4 and Figure 6 depict the situation f biogas g vernance archit cture in Indonesia in 2010–2013,
with mor detail on each progra and its implementing agencies from NGO and the directorates
under the MEF, the MA, and the MEMR.
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2010–2011 2012–2013
Distribution of power
Hivos entered the biogas
governance architecture, as a new
power in the regime
Hivos established YRE (a local NGO), it
increased the distribution of power within the
governance architecture
Coordination and
cooperation
Hivos had cooperation with the
MEMR through BIRU programme
YRE tried to expand BIRU cooperation, but
hampered by competition with SWEN and MA
Policy output of the
regime Dissemination number increased
The rate of rise of dissemination number was
increasing
Figure 6 shows that each ministry had more than one biogas program. F r example, in the MEMR,
the Renewable Energy Research Center (RERC) had their own biogas program, separate from the biogas
programmes in the Directorate of Bioenergy (RCRE MEMR, Personal Communication, June 2018).
This increase in fragmentation had a number of underlying reasons. First, on the government
side, each ministry had different motivations to carry out their biogas programs (MEF, Personal
Communication, June 2018). For the MA, the main motivation was to improve the management
of agriculture waste through managing cattle manures through activities, such as composting and
generating biogas. For the MEMR, the biogas program aimed to reduce the cost of subsidy for kerosene
and LPG and to achieve a renewable energy target. For the MEF, the biogas program had as key
objectives to (1) conserve the forest, by providing alternative energy sources (replacing firewood) for
the community surrounding forest, and (2) to reduced emissions by introducing biogas as part of
climate action (Bappenas, Personal Communication, June 2018).
The second reason was the lack of coordination among institutions and unwillingness to integrate
their different motivations. This lack of coordination was influenced by ‘institutional ego’ and
hierarchical structures that hampered the regime in moving towards common goals. Institutional ego
is the selfish attitude of an institution that avoids cooperation. Institutional ego led state actors do not
participate in common agreements within the governance architecture of the regime [11,23].
For instance, the MA only wanted to come for a coordination meeting if the invitation came
from a higher ministry, such as the MDP (Ministry of Development Planning) or the MM (Ministry of
Coordinator of Maritimes) as this quote aptly illustrates: “The coordination should be held by the MDP
or the MM because they have more power and authority in the government architecture, not by the
MEMR or the MEF” (MA, Personal Communication, June 2018, translated from Bahasa). In addition,
the MA refused to provide biogas data to the MEF who gathered data on emission reduction from
Sustainability 2020, 12, 1358 12 of 23
biogas (MEF, Personal Communication, June 2018). Finally, the lack of coordination also resulted from
a lack of priority given by the central government to biogas. Many ministries simply had no time
to perform coordination, due to other (higher priority) tasks they had to accomplish (MEF, Personal
Communication, June 2018).
In the period of 2010–2013, governmental biogas programmes were somehow divided into two
groups, one from SWEN that worked mostly with the MA and another one from BIRU that worked
mostly with the MEMR (SWEN, Personal Communication, June 2018). This relates to the third
reason for the fragmented nature of the regime. BIRU and SWEN had different views about the ideal
biogas technology, its market development, and the approach to maintaining biodigester quality (YRE,
Personal Communication, June 2018; SWEN, Personal Communication, June 2018). BIRU argued that
fixed-dome digesters were a strong technology and proven in other developing countries, while SWEN
believed that the floating drum (fibre digester) type was more suitable for Indonesia’s earthquake-prone
geography. Furthermore, BIRU developed the biogas market and its actors by providing training to
hundreds of local organizations and to distribute techno-scientific information about biogas digesters.
These organizations then become BIRU’s construction partner organizations (CPOs) that played a
key role in installing biodigester on the ground, in Indonesian villages. By contrast, SWEN tended to
monopolize the biogas market as a way to maintain the quality of biodigesters disseminated.
The promotion strategy also differed between SWEN and BIRU. Both used the grant approach,
where they work as a vendor to the government that pays for a free biodigester for the community.
They differed in the commercial approach in which BIRU and SWEN were selling biodigesters to
communities or groups. In the second approach, BIRU provided 30% subsidy in the sale. This subsidy
came from carbon markets and development funds from international donors, as well as the MEMR.
The commercial approach removes the barrier of bureaucracy process in biodigester dissemination.
The contradicting ideas and principles between BIRU and SWEN, thus, reflected a situation of
conflictive fragmentation. The diversity of strategies a result of a situation of fragmentation that
brings out the diversity and new innovations, in this case to biodigester technology and approach of
its dissemination.
In 2012, Hivos established YRE (Home energy foundation) as a national NGO to continue leading
the BIRU program and to train more CPOs (Hivos, Personal Communication, June 2018). As such,
BIRU distributed their power to non-state actors. While the cooperation of BIRU with the government
was still limited to the MEMR, other ministries, such as the MA and the MEF still continued their own
biogas programs, with a majority of these collaborations with SWEN as their dominant vendor (SWEN,
Personal Communication, June 2018). At that moment, there were no an ‘agents of change’ that could
support the wider collaboration among actors.
This conflictive fragmentation regime continued between SWEN group and BIRU group until
2012. SWEN wanted the government to heavily subsidise biogas dissemination (SWEN, Personal
Communication, June 2018), while BIRU had figured out that the grant approach had become an
obstacle to their commercial approach. Indeed, some people refused to purchase BIRU digesters
because they expected free digesters from the government (YRE, Personal Communication, June 2018).
In other words, there were conflicting ideas between BIRU’s commercial approach and a system of
governmental grants. This conflict comes back in the next period (see Section 4.3).
Despite the conflicts, there were no discussions between BIRU and SWEN. Nor was there any
coordination and cooperation initiated by other actors to facilitate communication between SWEN
group and BIRU. The difference remained a hidden source of conflict within the fragmented biogas
regime, in which each group wanted to keep the (highest) benefits or budget for their own biogas
program, and to discourage efforts to facilitating coordination.
Despite the conflict, BIRU kept trying to intensify their partnership with the MEMR, in which
BIRU derived more donors and the MEMR gained more budget for biogas programs. In turn, this led
to more money being available for biogas dissemination and to an increasing number of biodigester
disseminated. BIRU’s strategy to train CPOs also created more expertise at biogas builders (SB. Utama,
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Personal Communication, June 2018). From 2010 to 2013, the total number of disseminated biodigesters
was around 16,000 units [36]. BIRU had installed about 11,000 digesters, the MEMR disseminated
around 4000 digesters, and the rest came from other programs in the MA and the MEF. BIRU and the
MEMR, thus, contributed significantly to accelerating biodigester dissemination, but the establishment
of BIRU and the cooperation with MEMR also increased the degree of fragmentation to biogas regime
(DB MEMR, Personal Communication, June 2018).
The situation of conflictive fragmentation also seemed to slow down the rate of disseminated
biodigesters since the government grant system was slowing down the promotion of commercial
biodigesters by BIRU and SWEN, as users preferred for free biodigester from the government (Hivos,
Personal Communication, June 2018). In addition, there were conflicts about overlapping dissemination
locations between different biogas programmes, due to the lack of coordination. This issue hampered
the opportunity to wider disseminate biodigesters. To solve this, the MA planned to develop a database
to avoid overlap of biodigester grants in the same location (TFCC MA, Personal Communication,
June 2018). However, to date, this has not happened.
The fragmentation also influenced the provision of training in biogas programs. Specifically, it led
to the existence of various types of training, which were aligned with the different approaches and
technologies by each biogas programme. BIRU’s training was followed with six months after-sale
services (Hivos, Personal Communication, June 2018), while the government biogas programs only
provided randomized training, without the certainty of services after installation (MA, Personal
Communication, June 2018).
4.3. (Limited) Cooperative Fragmentation (2014–2016)
In 2013, Hivos and YRE tried to extend BIRU’s collaboration with other government biogas
programs in the MA, the MEF, and local governments. This decision was motivated by a wish to increase
the number of biogas digesters and to increase the quality of digester technology (YRE, Personal
Communication, June 2018). This move affected the fragmentation degree in the biogas regime,
moving slightly from conflictive towards the direction to cooperative fragmentation. Many local
governments welcomed BIRU’s approach and integrating it to their local biogas programs. Compared
to biogas projects from ministries, these local biogas programmes have a shorter bureaucratic process.
Some government bodies henceforth started to have a formal partnership with BIRU; this increase
level of priority of biogas in the development plan of local governments. The partnership with local
government made the governance architecture was slightly more integrated, compared to the previous
period, before 2014.
Competition still remained between supporters of BIRU (the MEMR and local governments) and
clients of SWEN (the MA), yet some of their different principles started to change. Both parties kept
their own technological preference, but also started to diversify their business approach. After 2013,
SWEN did not only rely on the government grants, but also actively promoted their products to wider
markets, including companies and individual users (SWEN, Personal Communication, June 2018).
Meanwhile, BIRU started to compromise with the government grant approach by modifying the
scheme of governmental biogas programme. BIRU proposed that the government to change the
full subsidy scheme into partial subsidy (SB. Utama, 5 June 2018). This proposal was accepted by
several local governments, such as in West Java and West Nusa Tenggara province (AABR, Personal
Communication, June 2018). BIRU also initiated partnership with local farmers groups to speed up
feedstock collection for biodigester (KPSBU, Personal Communication, July 2018). Addition of more
local governments and farmers groups into the biogas regime increased the degree of distribution of
power within biogas governance architecture. It provided equal access to opportunities and resources
for more actors involved in biogas dissemination.
Despite the increased inclusiveness within the 2014 biogas regime, substantive coordination and
cooperation was still a problem between BIRU and SWEN as both parties refused to start communication
and preferred to continue the competition. This is illustrated by the following quotes:
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We tried to cooperate with BIRU, but it just did not happen because we have different technology and
approach, (SWEN, Personal Communication, June 2018, translated from Bahasa)
They (SWEN) uses different technology (fibre digester) and works a lot with many government
projects. I am curious about their motivation and vision, (YRE, Personal Communication, June 2018,
translated from Bahasa)
On the public-sector side, the government bodies also did not effectively coordinate and cooperate
across sectors and levels. There was no significant cooperation between biogas programs in the
MEMR, the MA, and the MEF (Bappenas, Personal Communication, June 2018). According to the MEF
(Personal Communication, June 2018), and the MA (Personal Communication, June 2018), coordination
about biogas programs should be facilitated by the Ministry of Economic Coordinator, according to a
hierarchical structure. However, it did not happen. Instead, one coordination meeting about biogas
programs was organized by the Ministry of Maritime Coordinator with the MEMR and the MA to
endorse biogas programmes (MCM, Personal Communication, June 2018). As a result, cooperation
among governmental biogas programmes was still very limited.
Nevertheless, coordination of BIRU and SWEN with more government bodies from 2013 to 2016
seemed to positively affect the output of biogas programs. In this period of a limited cooperative
fragmentation regime, the number of biodigester units more than doubled in three years, from about
16,730 in 2013, to 37,999 in 2016 [36]. Compared to the increase rate (3729/year) in the period of
conflictive fragmentation, the rate of increase in this cooperative fragmentation regime was also
significantly higher, with 7027/year.
The cooperation also affected the quantity and quality of training for users in biogas programs.
BIRU set the standards for the training and implemented the training in different biogas programs
where they had partnerships (Y Kontak, Personal Communication, June 2018). The training was
delivered through construction partner organizations, who transferred the knowledge to the biogas
users. These CPOs applied the same standards when they worked with other biogas programs
from the ministries and local governments (CPO, Personal Communication, June 2018). Interaction
among these actors, thus, triggered more distribution of techno-scientific knowledge across different
biogas programmes.
The distribution of resources (authority, finance, techno-scientific knowledge) in the biogas
governance architecture allowed different institutions to test new innovations, to improve the speed of
project implementation and to accelerate the dissemination of biodigesters. Some biogas programs
managed to have partnerships and joint responsibility in monitoring and evaluation, sharing funding,
and exchanging techno-scientific knowledge for improving social acceptance toward biogas. This
cooperation contributed to an increase in the policy output of the biogas regime.
4.4. Reduced Fragmentation: Centralization (2017-2018)
In 2017, the central government issued an instruction to unite all governmental biogas programs
under the MEMR (DB MEMR, Personal Communication, June 2018):
From 2017, there are no more other ministries having biogas programs, because all (biogas programs)
are moved to (under) DAK or SAF (special allocation fund scheme), below the MEMR. This decision
was confirmed by the presidential office to follow national policy about one data policy. (DB MEMR,
Personal Communication, June 2018, translated from Bahasa)
The so-called Satu Data (‘One data’) Policy is designed to improve internal government data
governance practices by providing a regulatory framework concerning organizational structure,
including the roles, tasks, and responsibilities of each key stakeholder. It aims to integrate similar
programs under the coordination of one ministry, to help the government to collect data about the
program (DB MEMR, Personal Communication, June 2018). The implementation of this policy had
important implications for the biogas programs in the MA and the MEF, which quickly getting smaller
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and disappearing in the period 2017-2018 (DL MA, Personal Communication, June 2018). In this
situation, the power of authority in government biogas programs shifted almost completely to the
MEMR, which reduced the degree of fragmentation within biogas governance. This change left only the
MEMR, BIRU, and the local governments in the biogas regime, and thereby decreased the distribution
of power in the biogas governance architecture (Figure 7).
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The MEMR claimed that the centralization plan aimed to ensure the quality of biogas and to align
it with the national standard (DB MEMR, Personal Communication, June 2018). However, at the time of
field observation of this research in 2018, there was no proof of this. Instead, the centralization reduced
the biogas program output from about 37,999 in 2016 to 36,032 in 2017 [36]. About 1000 biodigesters
are estimated to be excluded from maintenance as the centralization of power led some institutions to
reduce their efforts to maintain existing biodigesters. Furthermore, the budgets for biogas programs in
the MA and the MEF were reduced by the Ministry of Finance (DL MA, Personal Communication,
June 2018), which also affected the existence of training in their biogas programmes. Since 2017, the
MEF no longer covered the budget for training in their biogas-related program, and the MA had only a
limited budget for the training (DCC MEF, Personal Communication, June 2018). This lack of resources
had consequences for the ability of programmes to comply with training standards (YRE, Personal
Communication, June 2018) and it reduced the quality of the information received by the users, e.g.
on maintenance.
This policy change, thus, stopped the transition of the biogas regime towards more cooperative
fragmentation. In this case, the centralization of biogas programmes was a step back from cooperative
fragmentation and changed the distribution of power within the biogas regime. This resulted in a
decline of efforts to disseminate biodigesters, and thereby a reduction of the number of biodigesters.
The centralized power declined the opportunity for cross-sectoral collaboration and information
exchange across institutions. While the MEMR argued that centralized biogas governance aimed to
enforce compliance with the national standards (DB MEMR, Personal Communication, June 2018), the
lack of effective M&E of biogas programmes of the MEMR makes this doubtful.
5. Discussion
This research discusses the relationship between different types of regime fragmentation and its
policy output at the national-level. The main findings are as follows:
• The biogas regime in Indonesia underwent a transition from administrative, via conflictive
to cooperative fragmentation from 2009 to 2016, which contributed to the rise of biodigesters
disseminated.
• Within this transition, non-state actors (NGOs and companies) were key to cooperate with multiple
government bodies, business actors, and local organizations. Some stakeholders accepted to
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collaborate (cooperative fragmentation), while some rejected, due to conflicts of interest (conflictive
fragmentation).
• A transition to cooperative fragmentation occurred in 2013–2016, where there had been an increase
in the distribution of power and degree of cooperation within the biogas regime. BIRU’s decision
to start partnerships with various government programs and various funding sources contributed
to increase in the number of biodigester dissemination and quality of training activities.
• In 2017, the cooperative fragmentation regime was transformed into a centralization model that
reduced the distribution of power within the regime, followed by the decline of its policy output.
The gradual rise in the distribution of power meant that the biogas governance architecture
developed into a more inclusive regime. Over time, the degree of cooperation increased in a previously
fragmented biogas regime. From 2009–2016, there was more advanced coordination, information
sharing, natural collaboration, and formal partnerships among biogas programs within the regime.
This change indicates a possibility to upgrade the governance architecture to synergistic fragmentation
with a better distribution of functions and effects within the regime.
Nevertheless, while coordination among biogas programs was actually improving in 2016,
the policy change towards centralization in 2017 altered the biogas governance architecture completely.
Conflicts about data and funding appear to be resolved, but not in the logic of the synergistic
fragmentation. The national government resolved it by centralizing all power. It reduced the
distribution of power within the regime abruptly and thereby also stopped the move towards more
cooperative fragmentation.
The choice of centralization as a means of conflict resolution by the Indonesian government
might be caused by a misinterpretation of the logic of coordination within the One Data policy. If the
government interpreted it by creating a coordination setting in decision-making that has a certain
degree of autonomy to support experimentation and learning [37], then it may change the biogas
governance architecture to be more cooperative fragmentation. Instead of creating a centralized
coordination setting, the national government chose to integrate related programs into one project.
This decision can be considered to be caused by the institutional ego. This institutional ego created
competition among institutions instead of coordination. Additionally, a combination of fragmentation
and (economic) competition might result in the general decline of regime output. This so-called ‘race
to the bottom’ drives the regime away from synergistic fragmentation [11,13].
To avoid a race to the bottom, the regime progress in 2016 should have been focused
on synchronizing cooperation among biogas programs and its actors. The MEF (DC, Personal
Communication, June 2018) suggested that biogas programs in Indonesia should be connected
by creating synergy among the ministries. The base should be the existence of 70K villages as a joint
target for disseminating renewable energy. For example, in 2019, the MDP, the MEF, and the Ministry
of Villages should lead the coordination to divide the responsibility among the ministries, such as the
MA and the MEMR, to work on different villages. For the MEF, there are 2700 villages in surrounding
the forest and 6000 villages near conservation areas. However, this synergy requires the willingness of
the leaders in each ministry and the country itself (DC MEF, Personal Communication, June 2018).
In addition, there are also other themes that can be used to establish coordination for biogas
programs, such as the rural economy and environmental action (EAWJ, Personal Communication, June
2018). Those themes can be used by the biogas regime to increase the degree of cooperation and the
policy output of a biogas regime for energy provision and environmental action. Such a direction
can concretely improve the biogas governance architecture towards better policy output and more
effective performance.
This study has showed the approach to work back from the observed outputs of a fragmented
regime and built the case for linking these with changes in the various regimes. The use of qualitative
methods in this context provided several merits. First, it provides a deeper and more detailed analysis
by focusing on attitudes and behaviors of institutions/actors. Second, it encouraged interviewees to
expand on their responses and open up new topic areas which were not initially considered. As such,
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it enabled us to identify the presence of potential ‘confounding’ variables, such as the unique role of
non-state actors (e.g. SWEN) in the regime and their contribution to policy output. The interviews
showed that the different dissemination approaches (through grants or commercial) have more to do
with sticking to existing positions, rather than to some objectively ‘better’ approach. This directly
impacted the number of biodigester disseminated. Third, it created the possibility of triangulating
different sources of information, e.g. policy/project documents with the interviews.
This study shows how regime configuration (distribution of power/resources and interaction
among them—coordination, cooperation, collaboration, and partnership) affected policy output. While
we can make plausible claims about mechanisms linking output and regime configurations, there may
well be other (confounding) factors which we did not cover or get less attention in this study as a result
of our selection of interviewees and our interpretation and analysis of the data.
The governance of biogas in Indonesia resonates with other examples in the field of renewable
energy. The global renewable energy landscape, for example, consists of the International Energy
Agency (IEA), the UNFCCC, the CSD, UN-Energy, SE4ALL, and several global partnerships, initiatives,
and forums. However, these actors developed effective cooperation and established IRENA as an
institutional home that created a hub where the scattered initiatives can gather, exchange information
and generate synergies [38]. In cooperative fragmentation, specific actors remain outside of the main
governance architecture, but maintain coordination and cooperation. They remain outside because
most initiatives acknowledge the process of the main governance architecture, but many do not provide
a coordination mechanism that could ensure mutual compatibility [11,23].
Beyond energy regimes, in large river basins in Europe, Africa, and Asia, the lack of effective
cooperation across sectoral and administrative boundaries was identified as an important barrier
for climate action [39]. Without effective coordination, the distribution of power overlaps with
responsibilities in different decision-making centres. This situation creates contradicting actions with
loss of effectiveness and efficiency [40].
The discussions about cooperative fragmentation link to the concept of polycentric governance,
which has received much attention in recent literature [37,41–43]. In short, polycentric governance
originates from the concept of polycentric systems for implementing policy and governing a particular
problem in an area. An ideal polycentric system is multi-level and involves various actors [44].
Such systems may even consist mainly of civil society and private actors, ‘leading’ the governance
architecture [45]. The polycentric regime has various ‘centres’ at different scales that each may
independently create and enforce rules for a specific area. Some units may be self-organized as NGO
or parts of local governments system [46].
Polycentric governance is comparable to cooperative fragmentation because both involve
a wide-ranging distribution of power that fosters inclusion of people and stakeholders [29].
Those stakeholders perform effective coordination and cooperation across various levels. Such
coordination is likely in the cooperative fragmentation regimes that have loosely integrated institutional
architectures [29,47].
The concepts of (cooperative) fragmentation and the polycentric regime are a diversity of initiatives
or ‘the invisible hand’ of a market of institutions [12]. The power structures in the regime are often
adaptive, flexible, and vastly experimental [48]. This study proves that those concepts are useful in
understanding the distribution of functions and effects in the regime complex of renewable energy.
Both fragmentation theory and polycentric governance can be seen as a form of regime complex. In both
concepts, coordination between different governance arrangements within the whole architecture to
integrate each program relating to common objectives is required. The government bodies need to
better have coordination with non-state institutions in order to minimize conflict, particularly with
regard to business and NGOs [11]. The interaction between actors within the regime can stimulate
work on how to address conflict among institutions [12]. Good coordination with bigger regimes
and a high level of institutionalisation through binding rules for partners are two of the main factors
Sustainability 2020, 12, 1358 18 of 23
determining the success of an effective programme [18]. Once the good coordination turns to be a
collaboration, it could serve the common good and positive impacts for shared prosperity [48].
6. Conclusions
This research applied the concept of fragmentation of regime complex and its policy output to the
landscape of national biogas (as part of renewable energy) governance in Indonesia, focusing on the
period from 2007 to 2017. The main results are as follows:
• The changes on the distribution of power and degree of cooperation within biogas governance
architecture triggered periodical shifts of configuration within the regime, from administrative
fragmentation in 2007–2009, to conflictive fragmentation in 2010–2012, to cooperative
fragmentation in 2013–2016, and to reduced fragmentation (and centralisation) in 2017.
• The cooperation between state and non-state actors contributed to increasing the number of
biodigester dissemination more than doubled in three years, from 16,730 in 2013, to 37,999 in
2016. This finding implies that higher degrees of cooperation and distribution of power within a
governance architecture contribute to increasing the policy output of a (cooperative fragmentation)
regime complex.
• The argument on cooperative fragmentation is further strengthened by the regime change in
2017 into the centralization model that reduces the distribution of power within the regime and
contribute to influencing the decline of its policy output.
This study concludes that the fragmentation within renewable energy governance affects the
dissemination of its technology and its related knowledge. These relations evolve over time and
are based on the distribution of power and coordination among institutions within the regime.
The existence of a diversity of energy initiatives works to accelerate innovation and to increase the
speed of implementation. The speed of implementation can even be accelerated by having coordination
and collaboration among the initiatives, such as in the cooperative fragmentation regime. This regime
is found more favourable in tackling dissemination barriers in several aspects, such as shortening
bureaucratic processes, speed up feedstock collection, improving social acceptance, increase the level of
priority of the project, testing inclusive monitoring practices, and conducting technological maintenance.
By contrast, conflictive fragmentation has shown to have mixed results. While conflictive ideas among
actors triggers competition to create innovation, this competition (in the same geographical area) may
also hamper opportunities to widening the technology dissemination.
This conclusion suggests that to trigger an increase in policy output, (national) renewable energy
regimes need to have governance architectures that include a diversity of institutions with distributed
power (resources) and effective cooperation among them. This architecture can be facilitated by a
(group of) institutions who have high resources (authority, funding, and techno-scientific knowledge),
to provide (in)formal provisions for supporting coordination among institutions across administrative
levels, sectors, and types (state and non-state actors). This model can be tested for further research in
countries in the Global South that promote decentralization and local governance.
Further research is required to identify the relationship between the institutions’ coordination,
power relations, and market functions, in multi-level governance settings. Furthermore, research
should focus on key strategies that have the potential to catalyse a coordination setting within existing
governance architectures and its relation to outcome evaluation.
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Appendix A
Table A1. List of interviews.
Related Stakeholders > National Government LocalGovernment Private Sectors NGO Civil Society Academics
Key
Institution Programs
Hivos
(International
NGO)
BIRU (Biogas for
household) Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources
Agriculture
agency, Bandung
regency
Construction
Partner
Organization;
Yayasan Kontak
YRE (House of
energy
foundation)
Loan partner
organization;
Local Farmers
cooperative
(KPSBU)
su-re.co
(sustainability and
resilience-company)
Ministry of
energy and
mineral
resources
(MEMR)
RE (renewable
energy) programs
MEMR
• Directorate of bioenergy (DB)
• Research center of RE (RCRE)
Energy agency,
west java (EAWJ)
SWEN (a
biodigester
company)
Hivos, YRE
Directorate of
research and
community
development,
University of
Indonesia,
Ministry of
Agriculture
(MA)
BATAMAS (biogas
with community),
UPPO (organic
fertilizer unit)
MA
• Directorate of livestock (DL)
• Directorate of agriculture infrastructure
• Taskforce on climate change or TFCC in MA
Agriculture
agency, Bandung
regency (AABR)
SWEN Bogor agricultureinstitute
Ministry of
Environment
and Forestry
(MEF)
Proklim, com-dev
in the conservation
area
MEF
• Directorate of conservation (DC)
• Directorate of climate change (DCC)
SWEN
Coordination of
policy planning
and
implementation
• Ministry of Development Planning
• Ministry of coordinator of Maritimes (MCM)
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Appendix B
Table A2. List of reviewed documents.
Key Institutions Programmes/Topics Project Reports, Policy Documents
Hivos, YRE BIRU
• BIRU Annual report 2013-2017
• Final report, BIRU 2009-2013
• AGREEMENT between BIRU and MEMR, 2013, and its amendment in 2014
• BIRU, provincial report, 2017
• Sustainability of bioenergy for climate change, Transrisk and Greenwin, 2017
• Value creation bioslurry, 2018
• BIRU structural organization
• Biodigester data per province, 2016
• Final report of impact assessment of BIRU, 2016
• The Indonesia domestic Biogas Programme, IIED 2015
• Work plan of BIRU, 2015
Ministry of energy
and mineral
resources (MEMR)
RE programs
• Implementation of biogas production/projects, 2018
• Special allocation fund for household biogas projects, 2018
• Development of Indonesian biogas, 2015
• PEMANFAATAN BIOGAS DAK BIDANG ENERGI PERDESAAN TAHUN 2014
• Work plan on biogas development, 2015
Ministry of
Agriculture (MA) BATAMAS, UPPO
• UPPO report, 2008-2015
• Database of biogas, compost, and liquid fertilizer
• Structural organization of the MA
Ministry of
environment and
forestry (MEF)
Proklim, com-dev in the
conservation area
• GHG Emission Reduction of Biogas Utilization by Household Community In Bali, Indonesia, by Hiroshima University
• ADOPSI PROGRAM PEMBUATAN BIOGAS DI DESA PENYANGGA TAMAN NASIONAL GUNUNG MERAPI DAN
TAMAN NASIONAL GUNUNG MERBABU
• Decree no 80/2017 by Director general of conservation of the MEF, on supporting villages in the buffer zone of national
parks/conservation area
Coordination of policy
planning and implementation
• Indonesia as a maritime country, biogas as part of the renewable energy plan, by Ministry of coordinator of Maritimes
• Bioslurry from biogas, UGM 2015
Policy and regulation
• Greenhouse gas emission reduction proposals and national climate policies of major economies, by ECOFYS and PBL
• Presidential regulation no. 22/2017 on National energy planning
• National energy policy, energy mix target (fossil fuel and renewables)
• MRV FRAMEWORK FOR ENERGY COMPONENT OF RAN-GRK, Climate change mitigation, UNEP 2016
• Climate action tracker, Indonesia
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